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Scott: The Right of Revolution: The Development of the People's Right to

THE "RIGHT OF REVOLUTION": THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO

REFORM GOVERNMENT
I.

RIGHTS RESERVED To PEOPLE

Government is instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of
the people, nation or community. Of all its various forms that is the best, which
is capable of producing the greatest degree of happiness and safety, and is most
effectually secured against the danger of maladministration; and when any government shall be found inadequate or contrary to these purposes, a majority of
the community has an indubitable, inalienable, and indefeasible right to reform,
alter or abolish it in such manner as shall be judged most conducive to the public
weal.

W.VA. CONST. art. III, § 3.

This passage of West Virginia's Bill of Rights echoes one of the
fundamental tenets of republican democracy. President Lincoln expressed this powerful axiom in an eloquently simple way:
"[G]overnment of the people, by the people, and for the people."'
The American Revolution was rooted in the belief that the people
are the ultimate sovereign, that government is, and must be, only
an institution of enumerated powers, limited in scope, and instituted
and sustained by the public will. Thus, government as envisioned
by our forefathers is a means to an end - the preservation and protection of the individual and collective rights of the citizenry. This
provision in our constitution protects the people from government,
reaffirming the truism that no government can impose its rule on
an unwilling people.
A measure of the importance of the concepts embraced by article
III, section 3 of the West Virginia Constitution is their wide acceptance in the constitutions of other states. While it has been said
that the principles of this section are so self-evident that they need
no expression, 2 the contrary seems to be true. They are, in fact, so

A. Lincoln, The Gettysburg Address (November 19, 1863).
2

Countryman, Why a State Bill of Rights?, 45 VAsH. L. REv. 454, 470 (1970).
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fundamental that 45 of the 50 states have placed similar provisions
3
in their constitutions.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has used the peo-

ple's reservation of power in unprecedented ways. The West Virginia
court is unique in American jurisprudence for the diversity of applications it has found for this expression of the people's sover-

eignty. This essay attempts to examine and evaluate these applications
in the light of the intended meaning of the provision, the history

surrounding its drafting, and the interpretations given similar provisions in other jurisdictions.
II.

HISTORY

In interpreting a constitution, the observation of Justice Holmes
that "a page of history is worth a volume of logic" '4 is especially

appropriate. A constitution, in its essence, is a contract among the
people. It is an agreement dictating how government, and its re-

lations to men, must be conducted. 5 A constitution lays out the rules.
It is the law by which all other laws are measured. As in contract,
we strive to effectuate, or at least acknowledge, the intent of the

drafters when we construe a constitution. 6 Accordingly, the West
Virginia court has declared that it is "the duty of courts to administer justice consistent with the organic law created by the

people." ' 7 This canon of construction is especially important when
one is examining a provision of a Bill of Rights - the protective
shield erected by the people to guard their most sacred rights from

government invasion.8 Consequently, it is paramount that these pro' The titles of these various provisions are revealing as to their purpose: ALA. CONST. art. I,
§ 2 (People Source of Power); ME. CONST. art. I, § 2 (Power Inherent in People); MINN. CONST.
art. 1, § I (Object of Government); N. H. CONSr. pt. I, art. 10 (Right of Revolution); VT. CONST.
ch. I, art. 7 (Government for the people; they may change it).
New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEx. L. REv. 693, 697 (1976).
6 The debate concerning the degree of persuasiveness to be accorded the "drafter's intent" rages
on. See Simon, The Authority of the Framers of the Constitution: Can Originalist InterpretationBe
Justified? 73 CALI. L. Rav. 1482 (1985). However, there seems to be some agreement that the historical context surrounding the drafting of a constitution is due, at least, some consideration. Consequently, a historical analysis of a provision remains relevant to, and helpful in, its interpretation.
7

Cooper v. Gwinn, 298 S.E.2d 781, 786 (NV. Va. 1981).

1 Pittsburgh Elevator v. W. Va. Bd. of Regents, 310 S.E.2d 675, 686 (f. Va. 1983).
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visions be thoroughly understood and correctly applied or their protective value inevitably will be eroded. It is for these reasons that
the historical context in which a provision originated and the ideals
and principles which motivated its drafters must be considered.
Article III, section 3 of the West Virginia Constitution originated
from the Declaration of Rights adopted by the 1776 Virginia Constitutional Convention 9 and in fact is drawn nearly verbatim from
article III. The Declaration's author was the relatively unheralded
George Mason, whom Thomas Jefferson lauded as a man "of the
first order of greatness." 10 One of the most influential documents
of revolutionary America, the Declaration, has been said to "sketch
the basic outlines of democracy."" In it, Mason set out to enumerate
the essential rights of man and to use these rights as the parameters
within which a democratic republic must operate. 12 The first sections
of the Declaration bear the unmistakable imprint of the theories of
John Locke. 13 Mason, like most of the prominent political philosophers of colonial Virginia, was a proponent of Locke's notions
about the state of nature, the social contract, and the inherent rights
of man. Consequently, the underlying basis of the Declaration of
Rights is that men, in forming a government, forfeit only a part of
their inherent rights. In other words, the people "have certain inherent natural rights, of which they cannot, by any compact deprive
or divest their posterity."14 Further, the Declaration makes clear that
all government power is derived from the people, and all government
officials at all times are amenable to them. 15 It is in this context of
colonial republican democracy that article III, section 3 of the West
16
Virginia Constitution must be read.

I

Although the delegates to this convention made the drafting of a Declaration of Rights one
of the first orders of business, it was not adopted as part of the original Virginia Constitution. It
was formally added to the Virginia Constitution in 1851.
10V. DABNEY, ViRGm : THE NEw DommIoN 136 (1971).
H. HILL, GEORGE MASON CONsTIrTrONAIsT 141 (1938).
V. DABNEY, supra note 10, at 136.
13 H. HLL, supra note 11, at 140.
" Id. at 136 (quoting the first draft of the Virginia Declaration of Rights).
Is Id.
'6 W. VA. CoNsT. art. III, § 3 provides:
Government is instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people,
nation or community. Of all its various forms that is the best, which is capable of producing
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An examination of the provision shows that Mason's words are
true to their philosophical underpinnings. With them, he lays the
cornerstones of representative democracy. Government is instituted
for the common benefit and protection of the people. The best government is the one that engenders the greatest happiness and is the
most responsible. But most importantly, the people always have the
right to change government in any manner that the majority of the
community feels is best. Permeating these words is the essence of
republican government, that all power is derived from the people,
and that government is always beholden to them.
Mason developed this philosophy over the course of years preceding the Virginia Constitutional Convention. During this period,
in 1774, he wrote the Fairfax Resolves. In the Resolves, the "most
important pre-revolutionary document prepared in Virginia,"' 17 Mason articulated what must be the relationship of the people (the
Virginia colonists) to their government (the British Crown):
The most important and valuable part of the British constitution, upon which its
very existence depends, is, the fundamental principle of the people's being governed by no laws to which they have not given their consent by Representatives
freely chosen by themselves, who are affected by the laws they enact equally with
their constituents, to whom they are accountable, and whose burdens they share,
in which consists the safety and happiness of the community; for if this part of
the Constitution was taken away or materially altered the government must degenerate either into an absolute and despotic monarchy, or a tyrannical aristocracy, and the freedom of the people be annihilated."8

As can be discerned from this passage, taxation without representation, the banner call of the Revolution, is at the heart of
Mason's thoughts. More important to this discussion is his recognition that government must be representative of and responsive to
the citizenry. If not, it is no longer government, but tyranny.

the greatest degree of happiness and safety, and is most effectually secured against the
danger of maladministration; and when any government shall be found inadequate or contrary to these purposes, a majority of the community has an indubitable, inalienable, and
indefeasible right to reform, alter or abolish it in such manner as shall be judged most
conducive to the public weal.

v.
"

DABmY, supra note 10, at 136.
H. HILL, supra note 11, at 113, (quoting the FAIFAx RESOLvS).
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A year later, Mason addressed the Fairfax militia concerning the
rotation of officers within the company. In this speech, he expressed
some of the very principles he would later incorporate in that portion
of the Declaration of Rights which was later to become article III,
section 3 of the West Virginia Constitution:
When men entered into compacts to give up some of their natural rights, that
by union and mutual assistance they might secure the rest; but they gave up no
more than the nature of the thing required. Every society, all government, and
every kind of civil compact therefore is or ought to be, calculated for the general
good and safety of the community. Every power, every authority vested in particular men, is, or ought to be, ultimately directed to this sole end; and whenever
any power or authority whatever extends further, or is of longer duration than
is in its nature necessary for these purposes, it may be called government, but
it is in fact oppression . . . . In all our associations, in all our agreements, let
us never lose sight of this fundamental maxim that all power was orginally lodged
in, and consequently is derived from, the people." 9

Mason's speech illuminates the meaning of article III, section 3.
The closely parallel language of this passage clearly shows the origins
of the Declaration of Rights. 20 In particular, Mason's monologue

explains the "common benefit" clause of article III, section 3.
The "Common benefit" clause was intended to express the democratic
ideal that government exists to help the people as a whole. Com-

paratively, in the words of the West Virginia court, " 'State' as contemplated by the constitution represents the ideal; it is people united

together for their common benefits." 2 Whenever a government official takes more authority than necessary to achieve these goals,

government has gone too far. Consequently, the true import of article
III, section 3 is that when government is being used to exploit the
people, they have the right to change it.

A similar interpretation of Article III of the Virginia Declaration
of Rights was made by A. E. Howard in his comprehensive work,
Commentaries on the Constitution of Virginia.22 Howard discerns
two separate propositions encompassed by Article III. The first is
that government's primary objective should be to give the greatest

19Id. at 119.

20 Id. at 118.
2t Pittsburgh Elevator, 310 S.E.2d at 684.
A. HOWARD, COMuNTAPmS ON THE CoNSrrITTION OF VIRGINIA (1974).
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happiness to the greatest number of people. 23 The second is that
since government is formed by the consent of the governed, whenever the people become dissatisfied with it, they always have the
right to change or dissolve it.2A
While Howard chooses to separate these ideas, a simpler interpretation may be that this provision has a single aim: to establish
the citizenry's ultimate control over government and to express a
justification for its reformation. Under either interpretation the result is the same, the provision is essentially a statement of basic
political philosophy. Mason's references to "happiness" and the
"common benefit" express his vision of the purpose of government
and serve as the contextual preface from which the people's right
to reform their government is introduced.
A measure of the vision of Mason's thoughts is the acceptance
which they received at the Virginia Convention. Amazingly, after a
lengthy and lively debate over these most important principles, Mason's Declaration was adopted essentially unchanged. 25
Further testament to Mason's work was the wide influence it had
beyond Virginia's boundaries. Pennsylvania was the next state to
adopt a constitution and its Declaration of Rights "was taken almost
verbatim from that of Virginia." 26 These principles would later provide the framework of debate from which the first ten amendments
of the United States Constitution would be derived, 27 and the Declaration was the foundation for the French Declaration of Rights
as well. Condercet, the great French statesman, acknowledged the
greatness of Mason and his work when he said "the first Declaration
of Rights that is entitled to be called such is that of Virginia" and
"its author is entitled to the eternal gratitude of mankind. ' 28

23

Id. at 73.

2- Id.
21 H. Hu.L, supra note 11, at 138-39. The changes were mostly in wording with the exception
of the addition of two articles, one prohibiting the issuance of general warrants and the other prohibiting the formation of any government separate from Virginia within the commonwealth boundaries,
Howard, "For the Common Benefit", 54 VA. L. Rav. 816, 832 (1968) (quoting John Adams).

Id. at 833.
Id. at 834.
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In particular, Article III of the Declaration has likewise met with

widespread approval. No fewer than 45 of the 50 states have seen
fit to embody in their constitutions the right of the people to reform
their government. However, the influence of Article III has not been

limited to the realm of state constitutional thought. In probably the
most famous document in United States history, The Declaration
of Independence, Thomas Jefferson drew heavily from Mason's

Declaration 29 when he wrote:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they
are endowed by the Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these
are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. - That to secure these rights,
Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from theconsent of the governed, - That whenever any form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or abolish it and
to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their
Safety and Happiness.

More than likely, it is Jefferson's use of Mason's principles, as
well as their historical context, that has led legal commentators to

characterize Mason's Article III as the "right of revolution." 0 However dramatic a characterization this may be, it accurately captures
the spirit of the provision. But, as we shall see, this provision has

come to mean much more in West Virginia.
The history of the incorporation of this section into the West
Virginia Constitution, like the history of the formation of West Virginia itself,31 is fascinating and helpful in fully understanding the

provision. The creation of West Virginia has been called one of the
"few unambiguous results of the civil war." 32 However, the constitutionality of the methods used to form the state were at best

HILL, supra note 11, at 144 n.8.
3 Shobe v. Latimer, 162 W. Va. 779, 790 n.7, 253 S.E.2d 54, 61 n.7 (1979).
.1 For a comprehensive treatment of the formation of West Virginia see J. WILiAMs, WEST
VIRGINIA, A BICENTENNIAL HISTORY (1976); M. CALLAHAN, EVOLUTION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
WEST VIRGINIA (1909); 0. LAMBERT, NVEST VIRGINIA AND ITS GOVERNMENT (1957); R. CURY, A HOUSE
DIIDED (1964); R. FAST AND H. MAXWELL, HISTORY AND GOVERNMENT OF WEST VIRGINIA (1906).
11J. WIiAms, supra note 31, at 75.
29 H.
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ambiguous.33 Nonetheless, on November 26, 1861, the first Constitutional Convention of West Virginia convened. When it recessed
on February 18, 1862, the break from the traditions of old Virginia

was distinctly apparent in the Constitution that had been adopted.
Among the dramatic and widespread changes effected by the

convention were the discontinuation of viva voce voting,3 4 the establishment of a free school system, 35 and the complete restructuring

of local government from the county court to the township system. 36

Nowhere, however, was the break from the Virginia tradition more
clear than in the Bill of Rights adopted by the convention.
Unlike the Virginians in 1776, who made the drafting of a Declaration of Rights their highest priority, the West Virginians did not
adopt a Bill of Rights until late in their deliberations. 37 The Bill
which was ultimately approved differed greatly from the Virginia
Declaration. Notably absent were the first four articlei of the Declaration which outlined Mason's principles of democracy in grand
terms. Consequently, West Virginia's first Constitution nowhere de-

clared that men are created equal, that power is vested in the people,
or that men have an unalienable right to reform their government.
In fact, the original constitution had provisions condemning treason

against the state, 38 and restricting speech advocating armed revo-

1

See T. RODD, TRACING WEST VIRGINIA'S CONSTITUTION 20 (1982) (unpublished manuscript
available in THE WEST VIRGINIA LAW REvmw OFC). Aspects of the constitutionality of the state's
formation were tested in several United States Supreme Court cases including: Virginia v. West Virginia, 78 U.S. 39 (1869) and Virginia v. West Virginia, 209 U.S. 514 (1907).
-u In Virginia, voting had been oral.
Traditionally the voter stepped up to a table set up by the sheriff in front of the court
house, called out his name and his vote in a clear voice ... , then accepted the congratulations of the candidate or his representative, who was usually standing nearby ready to
dispense a large amount of liquor.
J. WILLiAms supra note 31, at 28. To the chagrin of many, this "spirited" system of voting was
replaced by ballot voting.
" None had existed in Virginia.
Criticism had mounted against the county court system in which centralized power in the
county court and political patronage had led to significant abuses.
17

DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST CONsTrruTIONAL CONVENTION OF WEST VIRGINIA:

1861-1863, at 1-39 (C. Ambler, F. Atwood & W. Mathew eds.) [hereinafter Debates.
M W. VA. CONST. of 1863, art. II § 10. While the existence of a treason provision in a state
constitution may seem unusual, in fact over 20 states have such provisions, most of which exist in
constitutional harmony with provisions similar to v. VA. CONST. art. III, § 3.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol90/iss1/15

8

Scott: The Right of Revolution: The Development of the People's Right to
1987]

THE "'RIGHTOF REVOLUTION"

lution.3 9 Apparently, the Civil War had made the delegates leery of
legitimizing the right to abolish a state government (an act they,
themselves had just completed), and prompted them to constitutionally discourage anyone so inclined. Other commentators have
speculated that the abbreviated Bill of Rights was the result of the
no-nonsense philosophical stance of the Republican-partisan con40
vention and its belief that such clauses were simply not needed.
For whatever the reasons, the absence of these fundamental rights
probably was not unintentional. 41 The Constitution of 1863, however, was not the final chapter of West Virginia's constitutional
story.
The predominately Republican convention had structured the
government of West Virginia in ways that were not favored by the
Democratic majority of the state. Before the Civil War, Democrats
had dominated state government in western Virginia and were naturally sympathetic to the Virginia cause and to secession. Consequently, most of the political leaders of the day, as well as the
Confederate-sympathetic citizenry, did not participate in the actions
that split Virginia. 42 In contrast, the Republican party had been a
politically impotent, tiny minority confined almost entirely to the
state's northern panhandle. After the war, as the thousands of confederates returned to their homes and resumed their civilian lives,
the Republican leadership began to realize their hold on state government was shaky at best. Fearing the loss of power and aware of
the possibility that the Democratic majority might try to reunite the
Virginias, the Republicans, in 1865 and the years that followed,
enacted a series of laws which effectively disfranchised the returning
Confederate electorate. 43 These measures generally took the form of
test oaths, which made it illegal for Confederates to vote or hold
office. Historian John Williams characterized the Republicans'
quandary:

"' W. VA. CONST. of 1863, art. II § 10. Under this article, which concerned free speech, speech
encouraging an insurrection or armed invasion of the state could be punished criminally.
41 DEBATES, supra note 37, at 1-40.
41 Id.

,2 J. WiLLiAms, supra note 31, at 81-82, 86-87.
41 M. CALLAHAN, supra note 31, at 23-28.
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"Their goals were democratic and egalitarian, but they believed that circumstances
obliged them to proceed in undemocratic ways. Arbitrary procedures further alienated their marginal supporters and increased the temptation to define 'loyalty'
so as to exclude everyone but faithful Republicans.""

Discontent with these measures continued to build until 1870
when many laws were struck down as violative of the newly-passed
15th amendment to the United States Constitution. 45 With the Confederate's renewed right to vote, the Democrats took control of the
state in 1871. Immediately, they set out to re-write the state's constitution.
The Constitution of 1872 reflected the delegates' indignation toward the partisanship of the preceding decade. Indeed, the avowed
purpose of mahy was to "restore pre-bellum conditions as far as
possible." ' 46 The document which emerged from this convention was

true to the delegates' aim. They undid many of the changes made
by the first convention, including reinstating the county court system
of local government. However, the Bill of Rights adopted by the
delegates, as clearly as any other action, reflected their complete
dissatisfaction with the government which preceded them.
Article III, section 3 of the West Virginia Constitution was particularly illustrative of this dissatisfaction. In a backlash against the
partisanism that had disfranchised the former Confederates, the delegates were determined that the new Constitution must protect the
right of the people to reform or abolish their government. Colonel
Johnson, a delegate from Tyler County, proposed a provision be
included in the new Constitution which declared that all power inhered in the people and recognized their right to reform government. 47 The Colonel was so emphatic on this point that he opposed
the first provision of the new Constitution, which declared the Con-

J. WmLLAMS, supra note 31, at 89.
Id. at 90. Before the laws were invalidated, however, liberal Republicans had proposed the
Flick Amendment which would have restored voting privileges to those disfranchised. This amendment
was subsequently ratified by the people in 1871 by a majority so sizeable that it appeared many
disfranchised must have voted in its favor. M. CALLA.AN, supra note 31, at 28.
"6M. CALLAuAN, supra note 31, at 28.
4' JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF VEST VIRGINIA OF 1872 at 46.
41
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stitution of the United States as the Supreme Law, because it was
contrary to this "heaven born right to revolutionize. ' 48 On March
14, 1872, the convention sanctioned this right when it adopted the
first four articles of Mason's Declaration, including what is now
West Virginia's article III, section 3. The convention further supported the right of revolution by removing all restrictive language
concerning revolt from the free speech clause and by deliberately
excluding the treason clause.
The conclusion to be drawn from the history of this provision
is that, both in its original form in Virginia and in its ultimate
incorporation into the West Virginia Constitution, those responsible
for its adoption were motivated by the injustices of the oppressive
governments under which they had lived. Both the 1776 Virginia
Convention and the 1872 West Virginia Convention included this
provision to declare in the strongest terms that the government they
were framing would never impose its rule on an unwilling citizenry.
The provision was intended to insure that government would always
respect the inherent power of the people. Any contrary interpretation
would usurp the very power that the provision is designed to protect.
III. ANALYsis
With the history of article III, section 3 of the West Virginia
Constitution in mind, it is appropriate to examine the case law interpreting this provision to determine whether it has remained true
to the provision's aim. This examination will be divided into the
four broad areas in which article III, section 3 has been applied:
1) Police power, 2) inherent political rights of the people, 3) rights
of free political speech and association, and 4) equal protection. To
supplement the discussion, case law of other states, interpreting similar provisions, will be considered. The case law of Virginia, where
both West Virginia's common law and this provision have their roots,
will be noted where relevant.

41

Id. at 34.
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The only reported interpretation of article III, section 3 prior to
1977 came in the 1896 case of Mapel v. John.49 In Mapel, the petitioner was challenging the constitutionality of a statute which prohibited landowners from mining coal within five feet of the
boundaries of their property. 0 The challenger contended that the
law was an unreasonable infringement on the use of his property
and constituted a taking without compensation. 51
In sustaining the statute's constitutionality as a reasonable use
of the state's police power, the court said: "[R]egulations on all
these subjects (mine safety) have long been recognized as wholesome
and reasonable, and as fit subjects for the exercise of the police
power, as tending to preserve the rights of the citizen and to promote
the general welfare of the commonwealth. 5' 2 On the question of
whether the statute inflicted an undue burden on the petitioner, the
court stated that, "[ulpon each one [adjoining property owners] is
therefore imposed the correlative duty of so using his own land as
not to injure his neighbor's or be hurtful to the commonwealth.., for government is instituted for the common benefit, protection, and security of the people, nation, or community.""
2.

Analysis

The court's reliance on article III, section 3 to justify the use
of the legislature's police power in Mapel was anomalous. On no
other police power question has the court turned to this provision
for direction. On all other occasions, the court has looked either to
article III, section 9 (eminent domain clause) or article III, section
10 (due process clause) of the West Virginia Constitution. In Board

,9 Mapel v. John, 42 W. Va. 30, 24 S.E. 608 (1896).
'0 Today, a similar statute lives on in constitutional vigor: W. VA. CODE § 37-5-1 (1923).
" Mape, 42 W. Va. at 35, 24 S.E. at 610.
2 Id. at 36, 24 S.E. at 611.
Id. at 36, 24 S.E. at 610.
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5 4 the West Virginia court
of Education v. Campbells' Creek Railroad,

held that "[t]his provision of our Constitution [article III, section
9], and the due process clauses of both the State and Federal Con-

stitutions are limitations upon the authority of the sovereignty to
take private property for public use." 55 Furthermore, it is the traditional approach of the United States Supreme Court to resolve

taking and equal protection challenges to zoning regulations under
the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to

the United States Constitution.5 6

Other state courts have also looked predominantly toward their
own due process clauses to measure uses of the police power. Courts

have been reluctant to interpret "common benefit" provisions as a
limitation on the police power. A. E. Howard has suggested that
Article III of the Virginia Declaration provides a workable judicial

standard of the "greatest happiness for the greatest number" as a
57
balancing test to apply to zoning and public nuisance questions.
Howard admits the inherent difficulties of such a test, however,
when he acknowledges that the "rights to happiness ... are not as
susceptible of judicial enforcement as some other rights." 58 De-

monstrably in accord with this statement is the Virginia court which
has not articulated such a test in over 200 years.
However, on rare occasions, some courts have turned toward
their version of West Virginia's article III, section 3 to find a con-

stitutional source for police power. An example is the Missouri case
of Marsh v. Bartlett. 9 There the Missouri court relied on article I,

section 1 of its own constitution 6° when it held:

Board of Educ. v. Campbell's Creek R. R., 138 W.Va. 473, 76 S.E.2d 271 (1953).
Id. at 476, 76 S.E.2d at 273.
56 See J. NowAx, R. ROTUNDA AND S. YOUNG, CONSTITrIONAL LAW 485 (2d ed. 1983); Euclid
v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
" A. E. HOWARD, supra note 22, at 74-75.
Id. at 74.
" Marsh v Bartlett, 343 Mo. 526, 121 S.W.2d 737 (1938).
" Mo. CONST. art. I, § 1 reads: "That all political power is vested in and derived from the
people; that all government of right originates from the people, is founded upon their will only, and
is instituted solely for the good of the whole." While this provision does not contain the "right to
reform and abolish" language of W.VA. CONST. art. III, § 3, it closely parallels the "common benefit"
portion of the clause.
'
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that all political power is vested in and derived from the people; that all government of right originates from the people, is founded upon their will only, and
is instituted solely for the good of the whole . . . The fundamental power referred
to above includes of course the all-important police power. This latter power finds
direct application to the general welfare.61

The reasoning behind the Missouri decision is entirely consistent
with the rationale of West Virginia's article III, section 3. However,
the West Virginia court has never looked to the provision for a
source of the state's police power. In City of Huntington v. State
Water Commission62, the court discussed the source of the police
power and its purposes:
the police power is a grant from the people to their government agents ... [and]
is ... not referable to any single provision of the Constitution, but inheres in,
and springs from, the nature of our institutions ... [T]he very existence of government depends on it, as well as the security of the social order ... [It] provide[s]

for the protection of the safety, health, morals, and general welfare of the public.6

While the West Virginia court has not grounded the police power
in any single provision of the state constitution, article III, section
3 is perfectly suited for that purpose. It mandates that government
must be "instituted for the common benefit, protection and security
of the people." Consequently, while the great weight of authority
indicates that article III, section 3 is not suited for judicial limitation
of the police power, it also seems equally clear that the provision
represents a potential source of the power within the constitution.
B. Inherent Rights
1. Case Law
Beginning in 1977, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
has turned to article III, section 3 of the West Virginia Constitution
with increasing regularity. In the past decade, the court has invoked

6 Marsh, 343 Mo. at 538-39, 121 S.W.2d at 743-44.
61

City of Huntington v. State Water Comm'n, 137 W. Va. 786, 73 S.E.2d 833 (1953).

61Id. at 795-97, 73 S.E.2d at 839-40.
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this provision no less than 11 times, compared to the single time it
was used in the preceding 105 years. One of the court's most extensive uses of article III, section 3 has been in support of the inherent political rights retained by the people.
The first time the court looked to article III, section 3 as authority for the political rights of the electorate was in Cowan v.
County Comm'n of Logan.64 There, the court discussed the potential
unconstitutionality of W.Va. Code § 8-2-2, which requires a community attempting to incorporate to file a petition, signed "by at
least 30 per cent of the freeholders of the territory to be incorporated. ' 6 The court noted that "valuable political rights are reserved for a majority of the community" not merely to freeholders .66
The court observed this deficiency in passing, however, and since
the constitutionality of the statute was not before the court, it remained in place.
In Shobe v. Latimer,67 the court next turned to article III, section
3, in giving standing to citizens wishing to question governmental
actions under the Declaratory Judgments Act 68 even though the challenger had no direct legal interest affected. The dispute centered on
whether the chairman of a trout-fishing organization had standing
to challenge a government contract which would adversely affect a
stream which was fished by members of his organization. In finding
standing under the Declaratory Judgments Act, the court held:
Must members of the public whose substantial interests are directly and adversely affected by the acts of governmental officers stand idly by when their
public servants violate the law? We think not. In our society, the people are
sovereign.. . . 'All power is vested in, and consequently derived from, the people.

Cowan v. County Comm'n, 161 W. Va. 106, 240 S.E.2d 675 (1977).
§ 8-2-2 (1969).
Cowan, 171 W. Va. at 117 n.6, 240 S.E.2d at 681 n.6. Compare Piccirillo v. City of Follansbee,
160 W. Va. 329, 233 S.E.2d 419 (1977). There, a qualification of property ownership for eligibility
to sit on a city council was invalidated because it violated the equal protection standard under article
III, section 17 of the West Virginia Constitution (courts open to all; justice administered speedily).
This raises the question whether the court in Cowan was evoking article III, section 3 as recognition
of the majority's right to control government, or as a similar expression of equal protection. The
author will defer an inspection of the court's equal protection analysis under this provision until the
discussion infra note 119.
67 Shobe, 162 W. Va 779, 253 S.E.2d 54.
6 W. VA. CODE § 55-13-2 (1941).
6

' W. VA. CODE
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Magistrates [public officers] are their trustees and servants, and at all times amenable to them.' W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 2 ....
[O]ur constitution reserves unto
the people an 'inalienable and indefeasible right to reform, alter or abolish [the
government] in such manner as shall be judged most conducive to the public
weal,' and the best form of government is declared to be the one which is capable
of producing the greatest degree of happiness and safety, and is most effectually
secured againstthe danger of maladministration.W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 3 ....
We are bound to observe that if the people have an 'inaleinable and indefeasible right to reform, alter or abolish [the government]' in order to correct
the excesses of maladministration, they surely, through one or more of their numbers, individually or acting on behalf of the whole should have access to the
69
courts to achive the same end by judicial means.

In a footnote, the court observed that the portion of article III,
section 3 granting the right to alter or abolish the government has

been called a reservation by the people of the "right of revolution. "70
In Taylor County Commission v. Spencer,7' the court addressed

the mode of revising county government as laid out in article III,
section 9 of the West Virginia Constitution which essentially allows
a change of county government to be initiated by petition of ten

percent of the county's registered voters. The court commented that
the framers of the constitution had wisely left the ultimate deter-

mination of the form of county government up to those most affected by it. The court noted, however, that notwithstanding this
provision, or any other potential legislation in this area, "the people

of the counties are free to modify their local government in any
way which comports with the mandates of the constitution, '

72

in-

cluding article III, section 3. Thus, the court apparently held that
the people's "right to revolution" extends to the local government

level as well.
Finally, in Cooper v. Gwinn,73 the court again cited article III,
section 3 as an example of the rights reserved by the West Virginia
people when they formed a state government. 74
Shobe, 162 W. Va. at 790, 253 S.E.2d at 61.
Id. at 790 n.7, 253 S.E.2d at 61 n.7.
71Taylor County Comm'n v. Spencer, 169 W. Va. 37, 285 S.E.2d 656 (1981).
72 Id. at 44, 285 S.E.2d at 661.
" Cooper v. Gwinn, 298 S.E.2d 781 (W.Va. 1981) (case vested the right of rehabilitation to
state correctional institution inmates).
74Id. at 785.
70
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2.

Analysis
The West Virginia court's interpretation of article III, section 3

as a reservation by the people of ultimate control over their government is supported both by the historical context of the provision
and the overwhelming weight of authority from other states. While

other states have not applied these provisions in such diverse ways,
the underlying rationale that the people control government is be-

yond question. Incensed by the tyranny of British colonial rule, Mason clearly stated through this provision that government is
established only for the good of the people, who at any time may

change it. Similarly, this provision's incorporation into the 1872
Constitution of West Virginia was the result of Colonel Johnson's

demand for recognition of the people's ultimate control, their
"heaven born right to revolutionize. ' 75
In accord with this interpretation is one of the leading cases in
the nation construing such a provision, 76 Wells v. Bain,77 where the

Pennsylvania court discussed the people's right to alter government:
[This clause] embrace[s] but three known recognized modes by which the whole
people, the state, can give their consent to alteration of an existing lawful frame
of government, viz:
1. The mode provided in the existing constitution.
2. A law, as the instrumental process of raising the body revision and conveying to it the powers of the people.
3. A revolution.
The first two are peaceful means through which the consent of the people to
alteration is obtained, and by which the existing government consents to be displaced without revolution. The government gives its consent, either by pursuing
the mode provided in the constitution, or by passing a law to call a convention.
If consent be not so given by the existing government the remedy of the people
is in the third mode revolution."6

" JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF

VEsT VIRGINIA OF

1872 , at 34.

1, § 2 reads:
All power is inherent in people, and all free governments are founded on their authority and
instituted for their peace, safety and happiness. For the advancement of these ends they have at all
times an inalienable and indefeasible right to alter, reform, or abolish their government in such manner
as they may think proper.
77Wells v. Bain, 75 Pa. 39 (1874).
11Id. at 47.
76 PA. CONST. art.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1987

17

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 1 [1987], Art. 15
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 90

In interpreting its version 79 of West Virginia's article III, section
3 the Iowa court, while clearly acknowledging the people's ultimate

sovereignty, was not, however, as eager to constitutionally sanction
revolution:
These principles are older than the constitution and older than governments.
The people did not derive the rights referred to from the constitution, and, in their
nature, they are such that the people cannot surrender them ....
[And when the
government refuses to change] [i]t is evident that the people who think the public
good requires a change, can establish these changes only by superior force. If
they are powerful enough to succeed, well: they have altered or reformed the
government; but if they are not powerful enough to succeed, their attempt to
overthrow the government is treason, and they are liable to punishment as traitors . . It follows then, after all, that the much-boasted right claimed under this
section is simply the right to alter the government in the manner prescribed in
the existing constitution, or the right of revolution, which is a right to be exercised
not under the constitution, but in disregard and independently of it ....
It is well that the powers of the people and their relations to organize society
should be understood. No heresy has ever been taught in this country so fraught
with evil as the doctrine that the people have a constitutional right to disregard
the constitution, and that they can set themselves above the instrumentalities appointed by the constitution for the administration of law. It tends directly to the
encroachment of revolution and anarchy ....
It will be well if the people come
to understand the difference between natural and constitutional freedom, before
license becomes destructive of liberty.80

The analysis of the Iowa court is compelling. The right of revolution must necessarily be exercised against the existing instrumentalities of government and consequently, against the constitution
under which it is established. Further, the Iowa and Pennsylvania
courts both correctly note that the right of revolution lies in the
naturalpower of the majority of the people. Even though the Iowa

court declines to recognize this right while the Pennsylvania court
does, the rationales of the two decisions lead to the same conclusion:

that short of a revolution which will displace an existing constitutional government, the people's right to reform their government

exists within the political process, either indirectly through their
"' IOWA CONST. art. I, § 2 provides: "All political power is inherent in the people. Government
is instituted for the protection, security, and benefit of the people, and they have the right, at all
times, to alter or reform the same whenever the good may require it."
Koehler v. Hill, 60 Iowa 543, 614-16, 15 N.W. 609, 615-16 (1883).
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elected representatives, or directly through constitutional amendment.

It is in this area of retained rights that the Virginia court has
made its only significant interpretation of Mason's original third

Article. In Staples v. Gilmer,8 the Virginia court addressed the problem of the limited scope of a constitutional convention called under
section 197 of the Virginia Constitution. In this discussion the court

said:
The power to amend or revise in whole or in part the Virginia Constitution
resides in the people, not in the State legislature. The people are possessed with
ultimate sovereignty and are the source of all State authority ....
Undoubtedly the people have a right to 'reform, alter or abolish,' within
democratic principles, a part or parts of their fundamental law without reforming,
altering or abolishing all of it. The first binding declaration of this fundamental
principle was made on the 6th of May, 1776 .... as sections 2 and 3 of the Bill
of Rights. 2

Consequently, the Virginia court has similarly interpreted this

provision as recognizing that the people's right to reform their government lies within the existing political processes.

In noting that article III, section 3 of the West Virginia Constitution speaks of rights not limited to freeholders, the West Virginia court in Cowan also follows the trend of authority. In Wells
v. Bain83 , the Pennsylvania court continued its commentary on its

provision:
The people here meant are the whole those who constitute the entire state,
male and female citizens, infants and adults. A mere majority of those persons
who are qualified as electors are not the people.84

Similarly, the Connecticut court interpreting its counterpart

provision85 held:
Staples v. Gilmer, 183 Va. 613, 33 S.E.2d 49 (1945).
623-24, 33 S.E.2d at 53-54. Sections 2 and 3 of the Virginia Constitution are essentially
identical to W. VA. CoNsT. art. III, §§ 2 & 3.
Wells, 75 Pa. at 39.
Id. at 46.
" CoNN'¢. CoNsT. art. 1, § 2 states: "All political power is inherent in the people, and all free
governments are founded on their authority, and instituted for their benefit; and they have at all
times an undeniable and indefeasible right to alter their form of government in such manner as they
may think expedient."
82 Id. at
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They [the framers] were speaking of rights personal to the individual, as a
citizen of a free commonwealth, civil as distinguished from political, and belonging alike to each man, woman, and child among the people of Connecticut. 6

Such a broad interpretation of the rights reserved by West Virginia's
article III, section 3 is consistent with the premise underlying every
87
Bill of Rights, that such rights inhere in all men equally.
The West Virginia court's holding in Shobe, that the rights reserved by article III, section 3 form the basis for a citizen's standing

to challenge government action in the courts, also finds support in
other jurisdictions. The New Jersey court, faced with a corrupt local

commission, turned to its similar constitutional provision88 and held:
The citizen is not at the mercy of his servants holding positions of public
trust nor is he helpless to secure relief from their machinations except through
the-medium of the ballot, the pressure of public opinion or criminal prosecution.
He may secure relief in courts .... That the shortcomings of some public officers
may not make them accountable in our criminal courts does not mean that their
nefarious acts cannot successfully be attacked through the processes of the civil
law.89

Both the Shobe court and the New Jersey court recognized that
the primary purpose of provisions like article III, section 3 is to

insure that government remains controlled by the governed. The use
of the provision as justification for hearing challenges to governmental action facilitates this purpose and consequently is consistent

with it.
While the West Virginia court has been in the legal mainstream
in recognizing the people's right to alter their state government, its
State v. Williams, 68 Conn. 131, 151-52, 35 A. 24, 29 (1896).
The idea of political rights being vested only in freeholders seems easily disposed of now,
but at the time George Mason drafted the Declaration of Rights, suffrage in Virginia was limited to
white, male freeholders, as it would be well into the nineteenth century. It seems untenable to suggest,
however, even from the colonial perspective, that any of the rights guaranteed in the original Declaration - enjoyment of life and property, due process, trial by jury, freedom of the press, or the
right to abolish government - were limited to freeholders.
11N.J. CONST. art. I, 2 provides: "All political power is inherent in the people. Government
is instituted for the protection, security, and benefit of the people, and they have the right at all
times to alter or reform the same, whenever the public good may require it."
89 Driscoll v. Burlington-Bristol Bridge Co., 8 N.J. 433, 476, 86 A.2d 201, 222 (1952) cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 838 (1952).
86

17
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recognition in Taylor County Commission90 of such right in the con-

text of local government may be problematic. If the right to reform
government at the local level exists independently from state gov-

ernment control, the ability of the people to form a coherent and
effective state government would be dramatically impaired. Local
officials and their constituency could frustrate state government plans

by simply restructuring the local way of doing government business.
The New Jersey court recognized this problem in construing its parallel provision: 91
[T]he whole of the constitution may be searched in vain for any specific
provision guaranteeing to the people the right of local self-government, or prohibiting the legislature from exercising powers of local government through the
It is the very essence of
instrumentality of commissioners, however chosen ....
government that it shall operate upon those unwilling to be governed. The right
of local self-government if it exists, necessarily limits to that extent the powers
of the general government; it creates, in some sense and to some extent, an imperium in inperio. Such a limitation is not to be implied.92

The Connecticut court was faced with a similar question under
93
its constitution:
If it can be said that such a right [local self-government] ever existed, it was
not one of the nature of those which were described by the framers of the conIf there were any absolute right in the inhabitants of our towns to
stitution ....
regulate their town finances and affairs which was superior to all legislative control, it would be a great "political power." It would create an imperium in imperio, and invest a certain class of our people... with the perogative of defeating
local improvements which the general assembly deemed it necessary to construct... unless the work [was] done.., under town control. No set of men can
lay claim to such a privilege under the constitution of Connecticut."4

Undoubtedly, the West Virginia court did not have these results
in mind in Taylor County Commission when it cited article III,
section 3 in regard to local government. However, these cases point
to the potential problems that may arise under this interpretation.

10See Taylor County Comm'n, 169 W. Va. 37, 285 S.E.2d 656.
CoNsT. art. I, 2, supra note 88.
11Booth v. McGuinness, 78 N.J.L. 346, 353-54, 75 A. 455, 457-58 (1910).
9-1
See CONN. CoNsr. art. I, § 1, supra note 85.
14 Williams, 68 Conn. at 151-52, 35 A. at 29-30.

11See N. J.
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C. Free Speech
1.

Case Law

In 1980, the West Virginia court developed a novel and innovative use of article III, section 3 which is ancillary though closely
related to its stated purposes. In Pushinsky v. W. Va. Bd. of Law
Examiners,95 the court first looked to this provision for support of
the right to free political speech. In Pushinsky, the petitioner was
an applicant to the West Virginia State Bar, In filling out his application, the petitioner declined to respond to a question asking if
he belonged to an organization which advocated the forceful overthrow of either the West Virginia or the Federal governments. The
petitioner was denied admission to the bar for this response. 96 The
court held that this question inpermissably infringed upon his rights
of free speech and association as guaranteed by the First Amendment
of the United States Constitution, and consequently, petitioner's refusal to answer could not be grounds for excluding him from the
practice of law. 97 The court went further, however, and looked to
the West Virginia Constitution for additional support:
Moreover, in view of our state constitutional provision regarding the right
of the majority to 'reform, alter, or abolish' an inadequate government, we think
that the West Virginia Constitution offers limitations on the power of the state
to inquire into lawful associations and speech more stringent than those imposed
on the states by the Constitution of the United States.9

Thus, the West Virginia court reasoned that the inclusion of this
provision in our constitution was a tacit endorsement of the people's
right to associate and speak against their government.
In West Virginia Citizens Action Group v. Daley)9 , the court
reaffirmed this application of article III, section 3. In Daley, the
petitioner challenged the constitutionality of a city ordinance that
restricted door-to-door canvassing and solicitation to "between 9:00

91Pushinsky v. W. Va. Bd. of Law Examiners, 164 W. Va. 736, 266 S.E.2d 444 (1980).
Id. at 738, 266 S.E.2d at 446.
Id. at 745, 266 S.E.2d at 449.
Id. at 449 (footnotes omitted).
9West Virginia Citizens Action Groups v. Daley, 324 S.E.2d 713 (NV. Va. 1984).
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AM and sunset." In finding the ordinance an invalid time, place
and manner restriction under the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution, the court again went further, terming West Virginia article III, section 3 as "one of our state constitutional free
speech provisions, ' 10 which grants even greater protection to such
activities.
In Webb v. Fury'0 ' the court added yet another first amendment
facet to its construction of this provision. The issue was the right
to petition government for redress of grievances and its attendant
first amendment protections. Again extending greater protection under the West Virginia Constitution than found under the United
States Constitution, the court said:
West Virginia's constitutional provisions respecting the right to petition warrant that we give even greater room for activities alleged to be protected by the
right. Our constitution not only expressly guarantees the right to petition under
Moreover article III, section 3 reserves to the
the provisions of article III ....
people an inalienable and indefeasible right to 'reform, alter or abolish [the government] in such a manner as shall be judged most conducive to the public weal.'
... Thus while the United States Constitution guarantees to the people the right
to petition all branches of government, the West Virginia Constitution also gives
the people the right to 'reform, alter or abolish' it.102

2.

Analysis

The West Virginia court's position in Pushinsky, that article III,
section 3 extends first amendment protection to advocacy of the
forceful overthrow of our government, is a distinctly minority view.
The question of free speech as it relates to the violent overthrow
of our government has been addressed several times in the context
of prosecutions of members of the Communist Party under the Smith
Act. 0 3 In Scales v. United States'°4 the petitioner, a communist, had
been convicted under the membership clause of the Act'0 which

11Id. at

725.

v. Fury, 282 S.E.2d 28 fV. Va. 1981).
Id. at 37 n.4.
,02
,0318 U.S.C.S. § 2385 (Law. Co-op. 1979).
10,Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
1,"18 U.S.C.S. § 2385 (Law Co-op. 1979).
10, Webb
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makes it a felony to knowingly be a member of an organization
which advocates the violent overthrow of the United States government. The United States Supreme Court rejected a first amendment challenge to the law and held that the teaching of revolutionary
doctrines, coupled with advocacy of the violent overthrow of the
government, took his speech beyond the limits of first amendment
protection. 0 6 Justice Douglas adamantly dissented, maintaining that
the petitioner was really being prosecuted because of his communist
beliefs. He further maintained that speech related to revolutionary
overthrow of government should be constitutionally protected. In
support of this contention, he cited some 15 state constitution provisions, including article III, section 3 of the West Virginia Constitution, that reserved the right of revolution to the people. 10 7 Justice
Douglas wrote:
This right of revolution has been and is a part of the fabric of our institutions .... [T]he right of revolution is ultimately reserved to the people themselves . . [and] [t]o forbid the teaching of the propriety of revolution, even where
the teacher believes his own lesson, is to hinder the people in free exercise of
this great sovereign right.'

However, as Justice Douglas' position in dissent might indicate,
state courts interpreting these provisions have not adopted his reasoning. The states of Maryland, 10 9 New Hampshire, 10 and
Pennsylvania"' have all reached the question of whether their respective provisions extended such first amendment protections and
each has held they do not. The rationales of these court decisions
can be summarized by the words of Chief Justice Vinson in Dennis
2
v. United States:"
The obvious purpose of the statute [Smith Act] is to protect existing Government, not from change by peaceable, lawful and constitutional means, but

6 Scales, 367 U.S. at 251.

107
Id. at 275 (Douglas J., dissenting).
"I Id. at 269, 277-78 (Douglas J., dissenting).
11 Braverman v. Bar Ass'n, 209 Md. 328, 121 A.2d 473 (1956) (case involved the disbarment
of a lawyer convicted under Smith Act).
110Nelson

v. Wyman, 99 N.H. 33, 105 A.2d 756 (1954) (case involved a legislative investigation

of political activities).
- Commonwealth v. Widovich, 295 Pa. 311, 145 A. 295 (1929) (case involved the State Sedition
Act).
(case involved a challenge to the Smith Act).
112 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951)
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from change by violence, revolution and terrorism .... Whatever theoretical merit
there may be to the argument that there is a 'right' to rebellion against dictatorial
governments is without force where the existing structure of the government provides for peaceful and orderly change. We reject any principle of governmental
helplessness in the face of preparation for revolution, which principle, carried to
its logical conclusion, must lead to anarchy."'

In accord with this view is the more recent case of Western Pennsylvania Socialist Workers v. Connecticut General.1 14 There, petitioners were challenging the action of the owner of a shopping mall
which had refused to allow them to circulate petitions on its property. The petitioners alleged this action "violate[s] their right to
alter, reform, or abolish their government" as granted under the
Pennsylvania Constitution, article I, section 2.115 The court refused
to apply the provision in this way and said that its interpretation
of the state free speech clause would control over any interpretation
of Pennsylvania's article I, section 2.116
Thus, the argument that provisions similar to West Virginia's
article III, section 3 extend first amendment protection to speech
related to violent overthrow of government has been an overwhelming loser. However, in situations not concerning the violent overthrow of government, there is case law to support that similar
constitutional provisions do safeguard the right of political association. The Oklahoma court, in considering the Oklahoma Constitution, article II, section 1,117 which reserves to the people the right
to alter or abolish their government, has said:

" Id. at 501. It is noteworthy how closely Chief Justice Vinson's reasoning in Dennis parallels
that of the Iowa court in Koehler. See supra text accompanying notes 79-80.
"4 Western Pa. Socialist Workers v. Conn. General, 335 Pa. Super. 493, 485 A.2d 1 (1984).
Interestingly, the attorney for the appellants was Jon L. Pushinsky, the same attorney to whom the
West Virginia Bar granted admission in Pushinsky v. W. Va. Bd. of Law Examiners. See supra notes
95-98.
"I Western Pa. Socialist Workers, 335 Pa. Super. at 499, 485 A.2d at 4. For the content of
Pa. Const. art. I, § I see supra note 76.
16 Western Pa. Socialist Workers, 335 Pa. Super. at 449, 485 A.2d at 4.
"' OKLA. CONST. art. II, § I provides:
All political power is inherent in the people; and government is instituted for their protection,
security, and benefit, and to promote their general welfare; and they have the right to alter
or reform the same whenever the public good may require it: Provided, such change be
not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States.
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[Tihere can be no question as to the right to reorganize an old or to organize
a new political party. It is a right inherent in the electors of the state, and such
a right is a necessary accompaniment of popular government, without which our
government would be bereft of efficient vital force and in danger of the evils of
absolutism." 8

While this decision lends some support to the West Virginia
court's interpretation of article III, section 3, the most persuasive
authority for this provision as a safeguard for revolutionary speech
lies in the peculiarities of the history surrounding its incorporation
into the West Virginia Constitution of 1872.
The Confederate-backed Democrats took over the state government in 1871 to undo what the Republicans had done in the previous
decade. The delegates of the Constitutional Convention of 1872 demanded a provision recognizing the "heaven born right to revolution," and article III, section 3 was the result. But to these delegates
the right to armed revolution was more than a mere abstract philosophic ideal. Many of them had lost family members in the Civil
War who gave their lives to exercise this right. Ex-confederates dominated their constituency and shared a profound belief in this right.
Consequently, these delegates fully understood the importance of
the words "the right to alter, reform, and abolish" government.
Evidence of their belief that government should not restrict speech
can be found in other changes made to the Bill of Rights.
Not surprisingly, the West Virginia Constitution of 1863, adopted
during the Civil War, addressed the problem of speech advocating
the violent overthrow of government. Article II, section 4 guaranteed
the right of free speech, but it also provided:
Attempts to justify and uphold an armed invasion of the State, or an organized insurrection therein, during the continuance of such invasion or insurrection, by publically speaking, writing or printing, or by publishing or circulating
such writing or printing, maybe, by law, declared a misdemeanor, and punished
accordingly.

Article II, section 10 further reflected the 1863 convention's fear
of revolution by creating the crime of treason against the state and
prescribing death as one of the appropriate penalties.
" Cooper v. Cartwright, 200 Okla. 456, 195 P.2d 290, 293 (1948). In accord with this view is
the Texas case of Bell v. Hill, 123 Tex. 531, 74 S.W.2d 113 (1934).
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As previously noted, the delegates to the convention of 1872 had
a drastically different perspective on the concept of revolution. Not
only did they adopt article III, section 3, but they also completely
removed the crime of treason from the constitution and struck all
language from the free speech clause forbidding speech advocating
an insurrection.
When these changes are viewed together, the 1872 convention's
desire to protect speech in this area becomes clear. Consequently,
while the West Virginia court's use of article III, section 3 in the
Pushinsky line of cases is virtually unique in American case law,
the history of the early development of our state and the adoption
of its constitution lend dramatic support to the correctness of this
interpretation.
D. Equal Protection/Common Benefit
1. Case Law
The West Virginia court's newest and most troubling interpretation of article III, section 3 came in United Mine Worker's of
America v. Parsons.1n 9 The defendant Micheal Parsons, an Assistant
Athletic Director at West Virginia University (WVU), was responsible
for the operation of the Mountaineer Sports Network (MSN), a branch
of the University's athletic department. Although not a radio broadcaster itself, MSN developed program packages featuring West Virginia University football and basketball games and bartered them to
individual radio stations. In exchange, the radio stations agreed to
carry 15 minutes of advertising provided by the MSN sponsors. MSN
determined the rate charged for the advertising, and sponsorships
were filled on a first-come-first-served basis. Consequently, due to
the popularity of the WVU athletic program and the fact that each
sponsor had an option to renew for the following season, there was
a long waiting list for prospective sponsors.Y° The dispute in this case
arose when the West Virginia Coal Association, a long time MSN

9 UMWA v. Parsons, 305 S.E.2d 343 (f.
110Id. at 347.

Va. 1983).
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sponsor, changed the nature and content of its advertisements. The
Coal Association's ads began to reflect its political opinions concerning the depressed business climate of the state and the changes
it felt were necessary to brighten the state's future. MSN, while recognizing the political nature of the adverising, felt it 'inappropriate
2
to refuse to run advertisements based upon their political content.'"
Not unexpectedly, the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA)
did not share the Coal Association's viewpoints on West Virginia's
problems and demanded equal time on MSN broadcasts to rebut its
views. MSN denied the request because there was no available advertising time. 122 The court held that WVU, in the context of free
speech, was a governmentally-created forum for the dissemination of
information. 23 Consequently, MSN, as a part of the University, had
a duty to maintain neutrality in political debates and to present both
sides of a political issue fairly. 124 This fairness doctrine, derived from
the Communications Act of 1934'2 requirement that radio broadcast
content conform with the "public interest," required that MSN "coverage of issues of public importance.. .be adequate.. .and fairly reflect differing viewpoints. ' 126 Here the doctrine was violated because
MSN presented only the Coal Association's side of these controversial
issues.
The most disturbing part of the court's opinion revolved around
its reliance on article III, section 3 as constitutional support for this
doctrine of fairness. The court opined:
The obligation upon broadcasters under the Communications Act of 1934,
47 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. to operate in the 'public interest' is analogous to the
obligation imposed upon state government by the West Virginia Constitution to
act 'for the common benefit, protection and security of the people.' . . . The
West Virginia's 'common benefit, protection and security' provision is an equal
protection clause. It is as applicable in the marketplace of ideas as it is in any
other context ....
By requiring governmental neutrality in the field of ideas and
the balanced presentation of opposing points of view in governmentally created
forums, our state constitution's 'common benefit' provision serves important equal

protection objectives that federal communications law has not been interpreted
M Id. at 349.
Id.
2 Id. at 351.
14 Id. at 354.
12

W47 U.S.C. §§ 151-56 (1982).
Parsons, 305 S.E.2d at 353.

'26
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to serve. One of these objectives is fundamental fairness, a concept inherent to
equal protection. Accordingly, we conclude that whe a state agency or instrumentality sells advertising for broadcast which presents one side of a politically
controversial issue of public concern, it is obligated under W.Va. Const. art. III,
§ 3 and art. III, § 7 [free speech clause] to preserve its neutrality by providing
a reasonable opportunity for the presentation of contrasting points of view in
order that the 'common benefit, protection and security' be served and fundamental fairness preserved.'"

Thus, in one fell swoop, the court not only declared article III,
section 3 an equal protection clause, a conclusion unsubstantiated in
111 years of jurisprudence under the provision, but it also formulated
a separate test, possibly more exacting than that of equal protection,
requiring that government action be in the "common benefit, protection and security" of the people. Consequently, a new and unprecedented judicial standard of review was created.
The court affirmed its belief in article III, section 3 as an equal
protection clause in Allen v. State Human Rights Comm'n.'28 The
court said the "fundamental concept of equal opportunity is also
reflected in several of our constitutional provisions,' ' 129 including the
common benefit, protection and security clause of article III, section
3.
Most recently, in West Virginia Citizen Action Group v. Public
Serv. Comm'n of West Virginia,30 the court, in a discussion of equal
access to public speech forums, quoted with approval the language
from Parsons when it held the PSC had jurisdiction to monitor politically-oriented inserts that public utilities placed in monthly bills.' 3 '
2.

Analysis

A discussion of the holding in Parsonsmust begin with the court's
assertion that article III, section 3 is an equal protection clause. No
j2,Id. at 354 (emphasis added).

Allen v. State Human Rights Comm'n, 324 S.E.2d 99 (W. Va. 1984).
Id. at 108-09.
110
West Virginia Citizen Action Group v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 330 S.E.2d 849 (V.Va. 1985).
"' Id. at 856-58. The court did not reach the question of whether the utilities were constitutionally
required to include inserts with opposing viewpoints. However, in Pacific Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Util.
Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1,reh'g denied, 106 S.Ct. 1667 (1986), the United States Supreme Court ruled
that a California regulation requiring such inserts violated the first amendment to the United States
Constitution.
'
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prior precedent, in either West Virginia or Virginia, supports this
interpretation. In fact, the West Virginia court has repeatedly looked
to its due process clause'32 as a source for the concept of equal protection. In State ex rel. Harris v. Calendine,3 the court said:
In the continuously evolving tradition of Anglo-American common law there can
be no fixed definition of due process of law, which is an inherently elusive concept;
nevertheless, it is apparent that due process of law under the West Virginia Constitution contains an equal protection component the scope and application of which
are coextensive or broader than the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.34

Thus it appears that the Parsons decision leaves West Virginia in
the unique position of having more than one equal protection clause
5
in its constitution. 3
The history surrounding the drafting of Article III of the Virginia
Declaration of Rights and its ultimate incorporation into the West
Virginia Constitution, also fail to support this interpretation. As previously discussed, George Mason intended this provision to extol the
right of the people to combat the evils of an oppressive government,
not as a judical mechanism to measure government action or enforce
equal protection of law. 3 6 The provision's inclusion in the West Virginia Constitution came as a result of the call for a provision recognizing the people's right of revolution, not the need for recognition
of equal protection.
An examination of other state constitutions is of limited use in
evaluating the merits of this interpretation. While these provisions all
have a similar import, the particular wording of each provision renders some more suited as sources for equal protection. 37 Provisions
"I See Pauley v. Kelly, 162 W. Va. 672, 255 S.E.2d 859 (1979); State ex rel. Harris v. Calendine,
160 W. Va. 172, 233 S.E.2d 318 (1977); Linger v. Jennings, 143 W. Va. 59, 99 S.E.2d 740 (1957).
" Calendine, 160 W. Va. 172, 233 S.E.2d 318.
114Id. at 179 n.3, 233 S.E.2d at 324 n.3.
- The problem may be more accurately characterized as the absence of an equal protection
clause from the West Virginia Constitution which has led the court to strain its analyses to find
components of equal protection in several provisions of the state Bill of Rights, including W. VA.
CoNsT. art. III, §§ 1, 3, 10, 17, 20. See Allen, 324 S.E.2d at 108-09.
1- See supra discussion accompanying notes 8-14.
117Such a change in wording is the inclusion of the word "equal" in the provision. See IND.
CoNsT. art. I, § 1; Omo Co NsT. art. I, § 2; OR. CoNsT. art. I, § 1; S.D. CoNsT. art. VI, § 26; UTAH
CoNsT. art. I, § 2. For other equally effective wording changes: See N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 10; R.I.
CoNsT. art I, § 1; VT. CoNsr. ch. 1, art. 7.
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more closely worded to article III, section 3 have consistently been
interpreted as inappropriate vehicles for judicial application of an
equal protection analysis.3 8 Consequently, it appears from the paucity
of authority for this construction that the court must derive this interpretation by equating the words "common benefit" with the concept
of equal protection. It seems clear, however, that the two are not
synonymous.
The conclusion the author has reached about George Mason's use
of the "common benefit" clause does not support this interpretation.
The preceding historical analysis concluded that this clause of the
West Virginia Constitution simply set out the philosophic goals of
government and reiterated the proposition that government is run for
the benefit of the governed, not for the profit of those in power. In
his authoritative work, The First Constitutions, W. P. Adams at length
examines the meaning of the phrases "common good" and "common
benefit''19 as they were used in Revolutionary America. According
to Adams, during the Revolutionary period the "common good" was
a rallying cry, used to inspire the factious colonists to put aside their
individual interests and unite, for the "common good," in the fight
against the crown. 140 Adams notes that the third article of the Virginia
Bill of Rights "names the common good as the highest consideration
guiding government action and a justification for resistance against
the abuse of governmental power.' 141 One colonial writer said that

M The only exception to this statement the author has found is Commonwealth v. Irving, 347
Pa. Super. 349, 500 A.2d 868 (1985). There, an inferior Pennsylvannia court also asserted, without
precedent, that PA. CONsT. art. I, § 2 (see supra note 76) was an equal protection clause. However,
this case can be distinguished from Parsons on at least two grounds. First, while the Pennsylvania
provision now contains none of the language typically associated with equal protection clauses, its
predecessor provision, clause 5, Declaration of Rights, Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 was more
appropriately worded for an equal protection interpretation:
That government is or ought to be instituted for the common benefit, protection and
security of the people, nation or community and not for the emolument or advantage of
(emphasis
any single man, family or set of men who are part only of the community ....
added)
Second, while the Pennsylvania court called the provision an equal protection clause, it did not
apply a separate, more demanding "common benefit" analysis.
I" According to Adams, the phrases "common good" and "common benefit" are synonymous.
W.P. ADAms, THE FiRsT CoNsnTroNs 218 (1980).
1"3Id.

14 Id. at 222.
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the "common good" demanded public servants who will "promote
the greatest happiness of the greatest number - who will not devote
their time, their abilities and the powers with which they are vested,
in advancing their personal profits and honors, and those of their
respective families and friends. '142 The writers of the time believed
"that the decline of the state was imminent" whenever individuals
43
saw their interests as divided from those of the public. 1
From these passages, it is clear that the phrase "common benefit,"
as it was used in colonial America, was not a synonym for equal
protection. It was, in fact, a concept of self-sacrifice of individual
desires to further the good of all people. Adams notes, however, that
the various bills of rights written at that time failed to "reach a
definition of common good that resolved the ambiguities inherent in
the concept.'"44 Adams concludes by observing:
mhe constitutionalism of 1776 presupposed not the uniformity of private interests
but only the possibility of resolving conflicts within the political system .... At
the heart of their solution for resolving conflict was the principle of representation.
They assumed that with the help of a fair system of representation, conflicts could
be resolved and the common good achieved.' 45

This passage points out the inherent dangers of the West Virginia
court's "common benefit" standard as set out in Parsons. Traditionally, it has been for the people to decide what is, or is not, in
the common good; thus, the title of West Virginia'a article III, section
3 is Rights Reserved to People.'46 The court's use of the provision
in Parsons completely ignores this fundamental precept. Article III,
section 3 is a reservation by the people of the right to reform government when they feel it is in their common benefit. Nowhere does
the court explain its leap of logic in construing this reservation to
Id. at 226 (quoting an anonymous writer in the colonial newspaper; Massachusetts Spy, May
18, 1776).
142

141

Id.

at 221.

I" Id. at 223. In attempting to define "common good," Black's Law Dictionary merely states:
"[A] generic term to describe the betterment of the general public." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 250

(5th Ed. 1979).
1' Id. at 229 (emphasis added).
1' Herein lies the irony of the court's "common benefit," equal protection interpretation. The
court has taken a provision designed to recognize the rights of the majority of the people to control
government and has used it as a tool to protect minorities.
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the people as empowering the judiciary. If any branch of government
can lay claim to being the spokesman for the people and the common
benefit, it is the legislature, not the courts. Other state courts, when
asked to strike down government action not in the "common good,"
have reached the same conclusion.
In Donahoo v. Mason & Dixon Lines 47 the Tennessee court was
confronted with just such a challenge under its parallel constitutional
provision.1 4 There, gross weight limits placed on state highways were
challenged as being "for public injury and not public welfare and
contrary to the purpose of Government.' '149 After noting such regulation was well within the powers of the state legislature, the court
observed:
Even if the Legislature has made a mistake of judgment in the exercise of its
discretion with reference to maximum weight loads, that is a matter entirely within
their sphere of action and it is not within the province of the Courts to undertake
to correct any such mistake of judgment. 15

In Campbell v. Jackman Bros.,151 the Iowa court was asked to
strike down legislation regulating the sale of intoxicating liquors as
1 52
not being for "the protection, security and benefit of the people.
In an impassioned opinion, the court reacted strongly to the suggestion that these words from their constitution were intended as a
restriction on legislative action. The wisdom of this opinion, and the
directness with which it speaks to the Parsons court, merit its inclusion at length:
This [clause] as will be seen, has no immediate reference to restraints imposed
upon the legislative department of government, but is rather, a declaration of the
reserved or natural right of the people to alter or amend their form or scheme of
government whenever in their judgment such alteration or amendment will promote

Donahoo v. Mason & Dixon Lines, 199 Tenn. 145, 285 S.W.2d 125 (1955).
TENN. CONST. art. I, § 1 provides:
That all power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded on
their authority and instituted for their peace, safety, and happiness; for the advancement
of those ends they have at all times, an unalienable and indefeasible right to alter, reform,
14'

',s

or abolish the government in such manner as they may think proper.
141Donahoo,

199 Tenn. at 151, 285 S.W.2d at 128.
Id. at 151, 285 S.W.2d at 128.
Campbell v. Jackman Bros., 140 Iowa 475, 118 N.W. 755 (1908).
152IowA CONsT. art. I, § 2.
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the general good. To say that the Legislature can not enact a valid law which works
an injustice or wrong or injuriously affects public interest or legalizes an immoral
thing is a proposition which will not stand investigation. In its last analysis, it makes
the test of validity of every statute its conformity to the court's view of the moral
law and not to the terms of the Constitution ....
[Tlhe nature and object of all
construction is to arrive at the meaning and effect of'the particular words under
consideration, and, when that meaning is found, it is still the written Constitution
which must govern us and furnish the ultimate standing by which the validity of
all statutes is to be tested ....
The question presented by the appeal is whether
the court, failing to find any constitutionalprovision expressly or impliedly in point,
may still declare a given statute void because it is violative of an assumed unwritten
Constitution or because it is out of harmony with the court's conception of the
general spirit of the written instrument. To our minds the suggestion is one filled
with danger. To acknowledge an unwritten Constitution is to create a legal fog bank
into which every court experimentally inclined may enter and return laden with
some new theory of governmentalpowers and limitations until the written charter
framed by our fathers and solemnly ratified by the people is relegated to the shelf
53
of forgetfulness.1

As the Iowa court cautions, the "common benefit" as a standard
of judicial review is an invitation to ruin. It runs the risk of arbitrary
judicial intervention where the court substitutes its judgment for that
of the elected representatives of the people. This risk is equally as

real when the court is asked to examine the acts of a government
agency, as it was in Parsons.While the decision in Parsons may have
been justifiable on free speech grounds alone, the court's reliance on
the "common benefit" analysis leaves open the potential for more
troubling decisions in the future. Consequently, this use of article III,
section 3 by the West Virginia court is not only the one most un-

supported by the case law and history of the provision, it is also the
one most fraught with potential harm to those the provision is intended to protect -

the people.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Article III, section 3 of the West Virginia Constitution has undergone an expansive growth in the case law in the last decade. This
notion of the reserved natural rights of the people has been used to
bolster the right of free political speech and association, to define

" Campbell, 140 Iowa at 483-84, 118 N.W. at 758-59 (emphasis added).
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the control which citizens have retained over the action and form of
their government, and to further notions of equal protection of law.
The timing of this expansion, 1977, marks "the A.D. of recorded
West Virginia judicial history." 51 4 The innovative and activist nature
of the post-1976 West Virginia court is well-documented.155 The development of article III, section 3 into a substantive, judicially enforceable provision is a miniature study of the court's activist tendencies and their inherent attributes and dangers.
The court's use of the provision to strengthen free speech protection for those petitioning the government or advocating its overthrow is justified by the unique history surrounding the provision's
incorporation into the West Virginia Constitution of 1872. Likewise,
the use of article III, section 3 to insure political participation of
a majority of the community and to find standing in citizens who
challenge government action is consistent with George Mason's mandate that government remain representative of, and responsive to,
the governed. The court's creation and use of the "common benefit"
standard in Parsons, however, runs contrary to these ideals of representative democracy.
The nebulous nature of the "common benefit" standard will necessarily lead to the imposition by the court of its own political and
social views on the actions of the legislative or executive branches of
government. Potentially, this could result in ruinous consequences.
While the Parsons court used the "common benefit" standard to
further what it felt were egalitarian goals, a future court may not be
so wise when reading its own philosophies into what is in the "common benefit." The classic example of this potentiality is Lochner v.
New York, 156 where the United States Supreme Court struck down
a New York law that limited bakery workers to "only" 60 hour work
weeks. The Court, in the spirit of free enterprise, found that the law

'4 Kanawha County Bd. of Educ. v. Rockefeller, 281 S.E.2d 131, 140 (W. Va. 1981) (Neely,
J., dissenting).
M See Hagan, Policy Activism in the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, 1930-1985, 89
W.VA L. REv. 149 (1986); Nichol, Dialectical Federalism:A Tribute to the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals, 90 W. VA. L. REv. (1987); Miller, The New Federalism in West Virginia, 90 W.
VA. L. REv. (1987).
M.6
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment by unreasonably depriving both the employees and the employers of the

freedom of contract, a freedom implicit in personal liberty. While
the Court said that it would not "substitute the judgment of the court

for that. of the legislature,"' 15 7 it admitted "[w]e do not believe in the
soundness of the views which uphold the law."'15 8 In one of the most
famous dissents in constitutional history, Justice Holmes warned of

the dangers of a court substituting its judgment for that of other
branches of government:
The constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory.... It
is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our finding
certain opinions natural and familiar or novel and even shocking ought not to
conclude our judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying them conflict
with the Constitution of the United States."59

Thus, while the court in Parsons found equal protection "natural

and familiar" to the "common benefit," a court of another day may
find laissezfaire economics just as beneficial. Therein lies the problem

with the West Virginia court's loose construction of article III, section
3. It has looked beyond the clear meaning of the provision's words
to its own sense of right and wrong. Perhaps the court should heed

the words of Justice Neely, who in another dispute over constitutional
interpretation has written:
Apparently, the author of the majority opinion did not agree with the drafters of
our State Constitution ....
Neither the existence of his opinion nor even its correctness, however, can erase the words from the page. That is the essence of constitutional government, government by law and not men. If judges are not mindful
of that restraint, who will be?160

PHmLIP B. SCOTT*

7 Id. at 56-57; J. NowAc, supra note 56, at 437.
"8 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 61; J. NowAK, supra note 56, at 437.
19 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 76-77 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
160 PittsburghElevator, 310 S.E.2d at 691 (Neely, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
* The author gratefully acknowledges Professor Robert Bastress of the West Virginia University
College of Law, the Honorable George M. Scott, Susan K. Brown, and William C. Porth, Esq., for their
thoughtful review of this manuscript. However, any errors are solely those of the author.
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